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Friedman: Assisted Suicide

PHYSICIAN ASSISTED SUICIDE
Leon Friedman

HonorableLeon D. Lazer:
We used to have on our faculty a very distinguished and
important authority on constitutional law, Leon Friedman', who is
now a professor at Hofstra Law School as well as our next
In addition, Professor Friedman was formerly
speaker.
associated with a small firm by the name of Kaye, Scholer,
Fierman, Hays & Handler, director of the Committee for Public
Justice, staff attorney for the American Civil Liberties Union.
Further, he has written extensively on numerous Supreme Court
issues of critical importance, authored books as well as leading
law journal articles, and directed several important committees
for the Association of the Bar. Similarly, everyone on this
committee seems to be doing their share of important work.
However, Leon Friedman's background is unique, and we are
extremely pleased to have him as one of our speakers today. So
now on the very interesting subject of assisted suicide, Leon
Friedman.
ProfessorLeon Friedman:
As we all know and will recall, the Supreme Court decided to
hear two cases precisely dealing with a narrow issue, namely,
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doctor assisted suicides.2 Ironically, the two cases are what law
professors dream about encountering in practice, because one
case involves substantive due process, the case out of
Washington,3 and the other case raises the issue of equal
-rotection. 4 In any event, what you have to do, and as the court
did for us here, is go through very detailed descriptions of these
two different doctrines. However, it is not easy to distinguish
between substantive due process and equal protection. On the one
hand, the Supreme Court cases dealing with equal protection,5
teach us that under the strict scrutiny analytical framework,6 any
time a fundamental right is violated, it is subject to strict scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause. On the other hand, we may
Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997); Vacco v. Quill,
117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
3 Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997). In Washington, three
physicians, along with others, brought suit against the State of Washington
alleging that a state statute that banned assisted suicide was on its face
unconstitutional as being violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id at 2261.
The district court held for plaintiffs, but the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed. Id at 2262. The Supreme Court held that there was no
fundamental liberty interest in the plaintiff's asserted right to assistance in
committing suicide. Id. at 2262. Further, the legislation at issue was
constitutional as being rationally related to legitimate government interests. Id.
4 Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997). In Vacco, physicians brought an
action against a New York statute making criminal the act of aiding a person to
commit suicide. Id.at 2296. The District Court granted summary judgment
for the defendants and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed.
Id. The Supreme Court held that the statute was not violative of the equal
Id at 2310.
protection rights granted by the federal Constitution.
Interestingly, the Court left open the door to future challenges to the
prohibition of physician assisted suicide; "our holding . . does not foreclose
the possibility that some applications of the New York Statute may impose an
intolerable intrusion on the patient's freedom." Id.
5 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. This section provides:"No State shall...
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
Id.
6 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §16-6, at
1000-02 (2d ed.1988) (stating that for a law to survive strict scrutiny it must
further a compelling state interest by the most tailored means available); see
generally Adarand Contractors v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995); City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
2 See
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have substantive due process analysis which is quite broad.7 The

Supreme Court noted in Meyer v. Nebraska,8 that "liberty"
protected by the Due Process Clause includes the right of an
individual "to marry, establish a home and bring up children to
worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and
generally to enjoy those principles long recognized at common
law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."9
In essence, therein lies the difference between a fundamental right
under the equal protection clause and your right under the rigors
of substantive due process analysis. Some years ago the Supreme
Court heard a case involving a person who wanted to get married
according to Wisconsin law.10 In Wisconsin, before a person
with a child support obligation can become married, he had to
obtain permission from the judge in order to comply with
Wisconsin state law on the issue. The Supreme Court declared
the Wisconsin statute unconstitutional and reasoned that the right
to marry is fundamental." In other words, if you have to ask for

permission before you exercise that right, it is a violation of equal
protection.
A few years later the Supreme Court heard Moore v. City of
East Cleveland,12 a case dealing with extended families who may
I Substantive due process concerns involve the area of law surrounding the

rights of "privacy and personhood." See LAURENCE H. TRmE, AmERiCAN
CONS
OTiONAL LAW §15-1, at 1302 (2d ed.1988).
8 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
9 d. at 399.
10 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). Zablocki involved a Wisconsin
resident, who according to provisions of the State's statute, was prevented
from entering into a legal and valid marriage in Wisconsin or elsewhere as
long as that person maintained their Wisconsin residency. Id. at 376. The
court struck down the statute on Equal Protection grounds, and concluded that
strict scrutiny "was required because the classification created by the statute
infringed upon a fundamental right, the right to marry." Id. at 381.
1 Id. at 390-391. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967). Loving
involved an interracial couple who were convicted after having violated
Virginia's miscegenation laws. Id. at 2. The Court held that the statute
arbitrarily deprived the couple of their freedom to marry, a fundamental liberty
protected
by the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 12.
"2 Moore, 431 U.S. at 497.
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live together in a single household. In East Cleveland, the city
had passed an ordinance that unrelated people cannot live in the
same house.' 3 "Who are unrelated people?" you ask.
Well, if the grandmother lived with two grandchildren who
were sister and brother, they are related, but if a grandmother
lived with two grandchildren who were first cousins, they were
not related.
As a result, the city law would prohibit the
grandmother living with her two grandchildren who were not in
the right degree of relationship that the law required. 4 The law
would also be vulnerable to attack on substantive due process
grounds.",

Indeed, if the right to marry is protected by equal protection,
but the right to live in the family unit is protected by substantive
due process, the question becomes at what point do we have one
and at what point do you have the other? It appears that on
Monday the Court will focus on due process and on Tuesday it

" Id. at 495-96. Section 1341.08 (1966) of the Housing Code of the city of
East Cleveland Ohio provided in pertinent part:
"Family" means a number of individuals related to the nominal head of
the household or to the spouse of the nominal head of the household
living as a single housekeeping unit in a single dwelling unit, but limited
to the following:
(a) Husband or wife of the nominal head of the household.
(b) Unmarried children of the nominal head of the household or of the
spouse of the nominal head of the household, provided, however, that
such unmarried children have no children residing with them.
(c) Father or mother of the nominal head of the household or of the
spouse of the nominal head of the household.
(d) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, a family
may include not more than one dependent married or unmarried child of
the nominal head of the household or of the spouse of the nominal head
of the household and the spouse and dependent children of such
dependent child. For the purpose of this subsection, a dependent person
is one who has more than fifty percent of his total support furnished for
him by the nominal head of the household and the spouse of the nominal
head of the household.
(e) A family may consist of one individual.
Id.
14 Id.
15Id.
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will center itself on the issue of equal protection. Of course, it
really depends on what day the case comes down, for it's a little
hard to distinguish between those two doctrinal areas.
The critical point at issue here is the fact that we have these
very general, amorphous phrases in the Constitution. At times
they overlap, cover similar rights or identical interests, and yet
the Supreme Court does not establish hard and fast distinctions,
does not establish hard and fast limits on them, and does not
establish a hard and fast division between the two broad concepts.
Another precise, albeit rather narrow, issue worth considering
in the doctor assisted, suicide cases' 6 involves the person suffering
pain in the twilight of their life who does not know whether he or
she can do it alone. Though not on life support, an individual
may come to find that they are in a position where they really
want to end the suffering, because they do not want to become a
vegetable and cannot end his or her life without some kind of
assistance from a doctor. In most cases, the person really just
wants to be sure that the law will not be interpreted as preventing
him or her from going to a doctor in this terminal situation, and
possibly asking for the doctor's assistance in terminating his or
her life.
Recently, a Washington law made it a crime to promote a
suicide attempt 7 , and which the Ninth Circuit ruled
unconstitutional on substantive due process grounds.'" Why?
Because your right to terminate your life is a very important
right, it goes to the heart of what we are, and it is very important
in terms of choosing our own destiny.' 9 It is certainly as
important as choosing whether to reproduce or not. There could
not be anything more fundamental then deciding whether to die,
but if it is fundamental, does that make it a fundamental
16 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997); Vacco v. Quill,
117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
17 WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.060 (1988). The section states in pertinent

part: "1). A person is guilty of promoting a suicide attempt when he
knowingly causes or aids another person to attempt suicide. 2). Promoting a
suicide attempt is a class C felony." Id.
sCompassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 594 (9th Cir. 1995).
91d.
I at 589 (discussing existence of protected liberty interest).
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constitutional right, or if we all consider it fundamental, does that
mean that it must be protected by some clause in the constitution?
The Ninth Circuit described all the different instances in which
important rights have been recognized by the courts as part of the
liberty right of the Fourteenth Amendment. 0 We all know that
liberty covers more than procedural rights; it covers substantive
rights that the state cannot take away from you, regardless of the
procedures that they afford. 2' For example, it covers things like
sending your children to school where they can learn German.22
Fundamental also includes sending your child to a religious
school," and of course, the abortion cases.24 It is a major decision
that we all have to face some time.
According to the Ninth Circuit, it is a major decision in terms of
the importance and fundamentality of that decision on some life
scale, putting aside the Constitution for a moment. 2 Clearly, we
cannot imagine anything more important than deciding the time
and manner in which we will die. Therefore, if it is so mammoth
and important and fundamental on a life basis, the Constitution
must recognize it.2 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit struck down
that law.
On appeal, the Supreme Court, reversed nine to nothing. 27
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion, with four
justices concurring including a succinct concurrence by Justice
O'Connor, in which she very carefully, as she has been doing
these recent years, qualified her interpretations of the majority
Id. "[Tihis Court has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in
matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 499. In addition to
rights to marry and have children, "liberty" specially protected by due process
also include rights to direct education and upbringing of one's children, marital
privacy, contraception use, and bodily integrity. Id.
20

21

Id. at 1459.

' Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
'Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 570 (1925).
24 See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992).
5 Id.
261d.

27

Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S..Ct. 2258 (1997).
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decision. Though she joins the opinion, she interprets the
specific meaning of the majority opinion and qualifies her
concurrence

as

being

applicable

only

under

certain

circumstances." Thereafter, Justice O'Connor veers off taking a
slightly different tack. 29
The majority decision indicated that substantive due process
does not mean important, or fundamental rights2 0 On the
contrary, substantive due process means a right that is deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." More important,
however, it is not a generalized right to die, because the Supreme
Court held in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of
Health,32 that where someone wants to give up a life support
system, that decision must be expressed by clear and convincing
evidence.33 The Court did not really say it was a situation
analogous to Cruzan, despite the fact it has been interpreted that
way, but they went up to that point.Y
However, there is no generalized right to die.Y If we are
asking for a right to be recognized as a fundamental liberty right,
it must be narrowly defined in the specific area that we are
talking about. In other words, there must be deeply rooted in our
history and tradition, a right to doctor assisted suicide, 6 and not
the generalized right to die. Thus, by defining the right in those
narrow terms, a fundamental right, a substantive due process
right will be recognized only if the specific right that is being
asserted in this case has been recognized and deeply rooted in the
37
Nation's history and tradition.
Now the minute you phrase it that way, the minute you define
the right as only this very narrow right, then of course the game
Id. at 2275 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

29 Id.
30
31

(O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 2303.

Id. at 2260.

Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
Id. at 280.
4Id. at 282
31 Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2303-10.
35
Id. at 2303.
37
1Id. at 2260. See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
32

33
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is over.
In fact, Chief Justice Rehnquist remarked that
approximately forty-seven states have laws against assisted
suicide,3" and then he cited to a related case also dealing with the
issue, Rodriguez v. British Columbia.39 The holding in this
Canadian case also represents the norm among western
democracies. 40
We have to put the Netherlands aside because they do recognize
by statute a right to doctor assisted suicide. 4 The Netherland's
experience has been debated back and forth, but doctor assisted
suicide cannot be deeply rooted in our tradition if forty-seven
states have a law against it. It never had a chance to take root if
all these states keep on passing laws against it. If we think of
substantive due process in those narrow terms and some state
came along and said we can't go to the opening night baseball
game, or can't go to the Knicks game, which is a deep tradition
in our society, then of course you would say well, we have been
allowed to go to baseball games all our lives, you can't take that
away from us. The point is, that the game was over the minute
the question was framed that way. They never had to look at any
other difficult issue relating to that matter.
Justice Souter wrote a very long concurrence in which he tells
the entire history of substantive due process.42 It goes back to
natural law 3 and it goes back to where substantive due process
was born, 4 and the decision of Justice Bradley in the Slaughter
House cases,45 and goes over every single case of substantive due
process. Everybody recognizes it. So, it is a wonderful teaching
tool. His conclusion is that substantive due process can be
invoked in a much broader class of cases. His definition, would

38 Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2260.
39 Id. at 2263.
40 Rodriquez v. British Columbia

(Attorney General) 107 D.L.R., 4th 342

(Can. 1993).
41 Id. at 404.
42 Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2312 (Souter, J., concurring).
43 Id. at 2275.
44Id.
41

Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16. Wall) 36 (1873).
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take in Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman 6 , which is a
very broad definition.
Due process has not been reduced to any formula;
content cannot be determined by reference to any code.
The best that can be said is that through the course of
this Court's decisions, it has represented the balance
which our Nation built upon postulates of respect for the
liberty of the individual, has struck between that liberty
That
and the demands of organized society . ...
tradition is a living thing. A decision of this Court which
radically departs from it could not long survive, while a
decision which builds upon what has survived is likely to
be sound. 47
Therefore, Justice Harlan would indeed say that it was a
continuum, it is not merely a resistance to an arbitrary restraint,
it's any resistance to an irrational or arbitrary government
position, which of course is much broader than the very narrow
way in which Justice Rehnquist decided the case.
There is another concurring opinion which counts, and that is
Justice O'Connor's opinion. 9 Justice O'Connor stated in her
46

367 U.S. 497 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan defined due

process as:
[N]ot the particular enumeration of rights in the first eight
Amendment due process, but rather, as was suggested in another
context long before the adoption of that Amendment, those concepts
which are considered to embrace those rights which are fundamental;
which belong to the citizens of all free governments for the purposes
of securing which men enter society."
Id. at 541.
47 Id. at 542.
41 Id. at 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting). "It is a rationale continuum which,
broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions
and purposeless restraints." Id. (citations omitted).
I Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2302 (1997) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opinion states:
There is no need to address the question whether suffering patients
have a constitutionally cognizable interest in obtaining relief from the
suffering that they may experience in the last days of their lives.
There is no dispute that dying patients in Washington and New York
can obtain palliative care, even when doing so would hasten their
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concurring opinion, along with two other justices joining her, this
is a very delphic statement which everybody has been fighting
over.10 "[R]espondents urge us to address the narrower question
whether a mentally competent person who is experiencing great
suffering has a constitutionally cognizable interest in controlling
the circumstances of his or her imminent death.5 I see no need to
reach that question in the context of the facial challenges to the
New York and Washington laws at issue here." 52 She interprets
this as a facial attack on these two laws, therefore, those laws will

be upheld if there is any circumstance in which they will satisfy
legitimate state interest.53 However, if there was not a facial
attack, but a more specific attack by somebody who is in the
situation that she described, then she might very well, the Court
The narrow
might very well recognize such an interest.Y
question, see how she frames it, "a mentally competent person
experienced great suffering," who is facing imminent death."
Therefore, Justice O'Connor, and at least two other justices,
would say we may have to recognize a right of that person to
doctor assisted suicide.56
I will tell you, I taught a course this summer with Justice
Ginsburg in Nice, and so I asked, " What do you want to teach ?"
deaths. The difficulty in defining terminal illness and the risk that a
dying patient's request for assistance in ending his or her life might
not be truly voluntary justifies the prohibition on assisted suicide we
uphold here.
Id. at 2303.
5o Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
51 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
I Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2269.
"The Washington statute at issue in this case prohibits 'aid[ing] another person
to attempt suicide,' . . . and thus, the question before us is whether the
'liberty' specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes a right to
commit suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in doing so." Id.
13 Id. at 2302. "I agree that the State's interest in protecting those who are
not truly competent or facing imminent death, or those whose decisions to
hasten death would not be truly voluntary, are sufficiently weighty to justify a
prohibition against physician-assisted suicide." Id.
I Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
55 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
16 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol14/iss2/10

10

Friedman: Assisted Suicide

1997

ASSISTED SUICIDE

425

She said, "I want to spend the whole time on the Glucksberg
case." s1 We spent two weeks on this case. I said, "I thought it's
all over." She replied, "Oh no, it is just beginning." She
thought it was just beginning, and what we did, it was an
interesting exercise, what we did was we took a specific person
and we analyzed what if a specific person, not a facial attack, but
a specific person was urging the right to doctor assisted suicide,
and the example we took was Mrs. Rodriguez, a Canadian case.
Mrs. Rodriguez is described as follows:
The appellant suffers from amyotrophiclateral sclerosis.
Her condition is rapidly deteriorating and she will soon
lose the ability to swallow, speak, walk and move her
body without assistance. Thereafter, she will lose the
capacity to breathe without a respirator, eat without a
gastronome and will eventually be confined to her bed.
Her life expectancy is two months. The Appellant does
not wish her to die so long as she has the capacity to
enjoy life, but wishes that a qualified physician be
allowed to set up technological means by which she
might, when she is no longer able to enjoy life, by her
own hand at the time of her choosing, end her life.Now that is a little more specific. That is a much more
compelling case. Justice Ginsburg thought that was an open issue
which was not foreclosed by the Glucksberg case. Believe me
she had students from the United States and abroad throwing that
one around. I can assure you it is a much more difficult issue.
The issue really is whether this law is constitutional as applied to
a person in that condition. As applied, again this is Justice
O'Connor, somebody who was mentally competent, experiencing
great suffering, facing imminent death, but concerned that he or
she may not be in a position to end things by themselves. They
want some help. However, that is a different situation. There
may certainly be some circumstances where someone in that
position may bring a case and attack the law saying forget the
I Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
5 Rodriquez v. British Columbia (Attorney General) 107 D.L.R., 4th at 342,
346 (Can. 1993).
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facial attack. I am actually in this situation and I want to be sure
I have a doctor who will help me. The doctor will not help me
because he's concerned about the law against doctor assisted

suicide. I want in my case, just in my case, I want this law
struck down or interpreted so that the doctor will be able to help
me. That is not such an easy issue.
Now the second case, out of New York, Vacco v. Quill,59
concerned equal protection.w6 New York law prohibits doctor
assisted suicide and the Second Circuit said, listen, people may
choose to die and the law recognizes their right to die under other
circumstances. 61 There was a time when you were offending God
and everybody else if you committed suicide. Therefore, if you
just hurt yourself, your attempt is a felony, namely your own

suicide, and they hung you for it, something, whatever they did
in those days.
The Court recognizes that suicide is no longer a crime.62
Refusing medical treatment, not putting in the life support
system, not allowing you to go on life support, you can choose to
do that.63 States recognize that. Therefore you have the right to
refuse medical treatment. You go on life support, you are on life
support, now you want to take it off. You have the right to do
11 Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
60 Id. at

2296.
Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 731 (2d Cir., 1996). The Second Circuit
held that the New York statutes that criminalize assisted suicide "[v] iolate the
Equal Protection Clause because, to the extent that they prohibit as physician
from prescribing medications to be self-administered by a mentally competent,
terminally-ill person in the final stages of his terminal illness, they are not
rationally related to any legitimate state interest." Id. at 731. "Those in the
final stages of terminal illness who are on life-support systems are allowed to
hasten their deaths by directing the removal of such systems." Id. at 729.
62 Id. at 724. Neither suicide nor attempted suicide is considered a crime in
the United States anymore, although 32 states, including New York, are
continuing to consider assisted suicide an offense. Id.
63 Id. at 727. The right to refuse medical treatment has been recognized in
New York for some time. Id. Judge Cardozo wrote that under New York
law, "[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his own body." Id. In 1981, it was held by
the New York Court of Appeals that this has now extended to the withdrawal
of a life support system. Id.
61
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that. You have the right to refuse life support, you have the right
to remove life support. In addition, you have the right to
palliative care at the very end, that's to say the person suffering
great pain, and the doctors give you a very large dose of
morphine, and that's enough to kill them.6 That certainly hastens
the end. The court recognizes that. Now, how different is the
right to doctor assisted suicide ,that is to say it's not palliative
care, not extremist, but I'm suffering, it is not life support
system. In other words, my pain and suffering will be continued
for some period of time. However, I'm not on life support and I
can't do it myself. I need some help. If we allow a person in
these four other situations to end their life, straight suicide, reject
life support, turn off life support, get palliative care at the very
end. What's the difference. It is just part of the whole ball of
wax.

If you look at this situation everyone has an interest in this one.
So there is a very interesting approach by Ron Dworkin. He has
written a book about euthanasia and suicide. He has written a
series of articles in the New York Review of Books, before the
case, after the case. In the latest issue, there is a debate between
him and other scholars about the case. Dworkin is a great teacher
at New York University, a philosopher. He has taken a great
interest in this case, and he and some other philosophers, never
mind the lawyer, philosophers, wrote a brief, the thrust of which
was that morally you cannot distinguish these situations, you
cannot distinguish between suicide, refusing life support, ending
life support, palliative care and getting doctor assisted suicide in
order to avoid great pain and suffering, even though you are not
on life support.
Morally you have that very situation and that is what the Second
Circuit said.6 Therefore it is an equal protection violation,
because like people in similar situations are not being treated the
same. That case goes up to the Supreme Court, and once again
61

Id. at 729. "Withdrawal of life support requires physicians or those acting

at their direction physically to remove equipment and, often, to administer
palliative drugs which may themselves contribute to death." Id.
6 See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (1996).
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nine to nothing, they reverse. 6 Now they have to distinguish
these other cases.
What is the difference between refusing medical treatment or
ending life support on one hand and doctor assisted suicide on the
other? Justice Rehnquist says, you have the right to refuse
medical treatment, it's protected by the common law rule on
battery. 67 If a doctor put an instrument and treated you when you
say don't treat me, do not put life support on, no, I am going to
do it, I will sue you for battery. Here, we have this giant
important issue, philosophical, constitutional issue, and I really
don't think it's going to be decided on whether it meets the
common law definition of battery. That is the way the decision
started. He then says there is a difference between sustaining life
and ending it, and if the patient wishes to cease doing a useless,
futile and degrading thing, such as staying on life support, that is
different than ending. Life support looks awful and it is useless,
futile and degrading, therefore, that is different then ending your
life with a dignified manner, just taking a pill or getting a
different kind of treatment.
Again, the problem in Vacco is that the Court had to distinguish
between what is permissible and what is not permissible.
Because if they are really all part of the same ball of wax, which
is what the philosophers said in the Amicus brief, that is a little
hard to say these four things are okay, but this fifth thing is not
okay. Another distinction Chief Justice Rehnquist makes in that
case, that in the palliative case, where you give morphine in the
very end, the doctor intends to ease pain and not end life.6 I do
not know if there are any doctors here who will tell us, are you
aware that giving this degree of morphine will not only ease the
pain, but most likely will end the life. I think that doctors who
honestly tell you that they know what they are doing and they do
it a fair amount of time. The final distinction the Chief Justice

Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
6I Id. at 2260 (stating that the common law rule on battery also prohibits
forced medication of individuals).
I Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2298-99 (1997).
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makes, there is a difference between letting a patient die and
making that patient die.
I don't know whether any of these distinctions really are going
to make it. In Washington v. Glucksberg,69 the fact is they came

up with some other state interests and there are at least five state
interests that we have to be concerned about."o One of them is
simply the state interest of preserving human life. 71 We simply
must make it difficult under any circumstances to end human life;
preserving human life is a very important state interest and you
have to show very good reason if you are going to undermine
that.
Secondly, those who request help in committing suicide are
often depressed, it will go away tomorrow n You got her in a
bad moment. Tomorrow she may feel differently. How do you
know that this is a really fundamental decision about your destiny
or whether I am just feeling terrible today. How do you know if
it's a depressed motivating decision or whether it's a real life
motivating decision.
Third, you want to protect the integrity and ethics of the
medical profession. 7 You do not want doctors thinking - am I
going to save this person or help them commit suicide? Some of
the studies in the Netherlands suggested that doctors are cutting
corners or maybe they are not cutting corners.
There were two studies in the Journal of New England Medicine
about the Netherlands studies. 7 There has been a huge
69 Washington v.
70 Id. at 2271-72.

Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).

Id. at 2272 (citing Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S.
261, 282 (1990)).
' Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2272-73.
73 Id. at 2272.
' Paul J. van der Maas, Euthanasia, Physician-Assisted Suicide, and Other
Medical Practices Involving the End of Life in the Netherlands, 1990-1995,
335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1699-705 (1996). Gerrit van der Wal, ET AL.,
Evaluation of the Notification Procedurefor Physician-Assisted Death in the
Netherlands, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1706-11 (1996). The studies
examined the number of physician-assisted suicides in the Netherlands.
Although technically illegal, physician-assisted suicides still occur in the
Netherlands, however, they are very rarely prosecuted. Van Der Wal, at 170671
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controversy about what is happening in the Netherlands, where it
is permissible. Are doctors in the Netherlands cutting comers
because, for example, there's a family that wants to get rid of the
financial burden, it's costing them a lot of money? So they say to
the doctor this is costing a lot of money, let us just get rid of this
person. There is at least some suggestion in the Netherlands they
are not following all the procedures, and you want the doctors on
the side of preserving life whenever they can and not giving them
an opportunity not to do it.
The fourth reason, which is related to this whole business about
cost, you want to protect vulnerable groups whose medical
situations are a financial drain to their families. 75 If there was a
generalized right to suicide, is the family going to encourage
someone, just end it. Again, there is some suggestion in the
Netherlands study that this might be a problem.
The last reason is that there is a slippery slope to euthanasia,76 at
what point are we going to open the doors. Remember what
Justice O'Connor said, competent person, great suffering,
imminent death." Where do you draw the line above that. These
are not very easy issues.
When we were teaching this course in Nice we actually argued a
hypothetical case. I was a justice of the Supreme Court, that is as
close as I will ever get, with Ruth Ginsburg, being the two
justices hearing the argument. We heard arguments from
students. We used the Rodriguez case, and Justice Ginsburg
asked me, well, what do you think? So I had to decide the case.

11. The studies are an empirical examination of the government's required
notification procedure of physician-assisted suicides. Id.
75 Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2273.
76
1Id. at 2274.
1 Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2302, 2303 (1997) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). In her concurrence Justice O'Connor acknowledges that there is
no generalized right to commit suicide, but reserves opinion as to whether a
mentally competent individual, experiencing great suffering and facing
imminent death has a cognizable right to commit suicide. Id. at 2303
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
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I must say there's a very good book I read this summer",
Maxwell Perkins, who was a great editor when he was around,
and Thomas Wolfe was one of his authors. Thomas Wolfe died
after a long illness, and Perkins spoke at his funeral, and what he
said about Wolfe applies here as well. You have to think of the
great line from King Lear, "He hates him that would upon the
rack of this rough world that would stretch him out longer.""'
There are people who are stretched out on a very tough rack.
Somehow, I do not know quite how, the Court's Constitution has
to give a little. I think we have not seen the last of this question.
Thank you very much.

78

A. ScoTT BERG, MAX PERKiNS, EDITOR OF GENIUS 354 (1978).

71 KING LEAR, Act V, Scene

H.
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